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Researching History at SDSC
David Horner
The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) now has the largest number of academic staff working in the field of military and defence history in Australia, and this should not be surprising, because history has always been critical to the study of strategy. This was particularly the case when in earlier times strategy was seen as 'the art of the general', but continued to be the case when strategy became the concern of politicians and, with the advent of atomic weapons after 1945, nuclear scientists as well. The introduction of nuclear weapons led to a new academic discipline, namely strategic studies, the imperative of which was exemplified by Bernard Brodie's famous 1946 statement: 'Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.' 1 But history remained central to the new discipline. It was no coincidence that the distinguished military historian, Sir Michael Howard, played an important role in the founding of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in 1958. As the historian Brian Holden Reid explained, Howard 'consistently argued that those who wrote about nuclear strategy and studied history "talked more sense" than those 1 Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Nuclear Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, 1946) , p. 76. who had not'.
2 Howard stated that he was 'unrepentantly a historian and not a social scientist. I think in terms of analogies rather than theories, of process rather than structure, of politics as the realm of the contingent rather than of necessity.' 3 Yet, despite its importance, history has always had an ambivalent place in the research interests of the SDSC. From the earliest days of the Centre, researchers in the field of strategic studies in Australia struggled to define it as an academic discipline or, more correctly, were involved in a continuous struggle to have strategic studies accepted as a distinct academic discipline in Australia. It was not the same as the discipline of international relations, with its antecedents of political science, although strategic studies had much in common with international relations. More broadly, the study of current defence policy could be seen as straight political science, but there was more to it than just politics. Some aspects of strategic studies drew on operational analysis. When it came to weapons systems, a background in science was important. Hence some leading practitioners of strategic studies have been scientists and, indeed, when the Cold War was at its height and nuclear issues were to the fore, nuclear scientists were important contributors to strategic studies. Strategic and defence studies (to give it a broader title) can also include the study of operational concepts and, in this regard, previous service in one of the branches of the military provides a good foundation.
As emphasised earlier, history is an important component of strategic and defence studies. The best way of understanding strategic and operational concepts is to examine how they have been used in past conflicts. The allied discipline of military studies (or military science) also draws heavily on history. To understand command structures, leadership, the problems of introducing new technology, the challenges of recruitment, the stress of combat, and the myriad other facets of military science, the best starting point is history.
In short, strategic and defence studies is multidisciplinary in nature, and this has been borne out by the background of SDSC's staff over the years. The first head of the Centre, Tom Millar, came from the field The ambivalence towards history within SDSC comes from the fact that, for the work of the Centre, history is not an end in itself, but a vital tool to be used to underpin contemporary strategic and defence studies. If the Centre were to produce only studies of military or defence history -even if they made an outstanding contribution to understanding Australia's past -it would be accused of not engaging with current issues, which was the reason for its establishment. In short, the Centre needed to be seen as a relevant player in the broad area of contemporary strategic and defence studies.
From the early days, research in SDSC focused on three areas: Australian defence, regional security, and global security. The importance and priority of these issues changed over time. During the 1970s, global security (including the important work by Ball on nuclear strategy) and Australian defence were the most important. After the end of the Cold War, regional security assumed greater importance, and military history was not central to the work of the Centre. In its early days SDSC had a small staff (by 1974 it had grown to three academic staff -O'Neill, Ball and the distinguished journalist, Peter Hastingsand a research officer -Jol Langtry, a former Army colonel) and they needed to focus on the key strategic and defence issues of the day. (1985) . This was the first time that an Australian official war history had a complete volume devoted to strategy and diplomacy, indicating that the reasons why Australia was involved and a discussion of the diplomacy were just as important as the actual combat operations.
At that time SDSC did not have PhD students of its own; they were officially part of International Relations, but in a practical sense they were part of SDSC. O'Neill's first PhD student, Neil Primrose, worked , 1939-1945, in 1982 , just as O'Neill headed off to the IISS in London. The Army gave me the time to complete my MA and PhD, following which I returned to work in the Army for almost a decade.
With O'Neill's departure, SDSC had no specific expertise in military history, but it was still able to make a contribution in this field. In 1968 SDSC started publishing the Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence. Over the next 38 years, the Centre published 164 monographs in the series and, quite rightly, their focus was on current strategic and defence issues. But many of them had a historical basis and at least 11 were primarily military or defence history. , 1942 -1946 (2005 and Blair Tidey, Forewarned Forearmed: Australian Specialist Intelligence Support in South Vietnam, 1966 -1971 (2006 . These history publications generally had some current policy relevance in that they particularly dealt with strategy, command, organisation and intelligence.
To a greater or lesser extent, I played a role in securing the publication of nine of these volumes. Effort, 1939 Effort, -1945 Effort, (1996 Breaking the Codes, which I co-authored with Ball, was a groundbreaking study covering the development of signals intelligence in Australia, counterespionage, and the establishment of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). It complemented Ball's earlier work on signal intelligence, and consolidated SDSC as a source of expertise on intelligence and security -a crucial component of strategic and defence studies.
I admit that not all of these books fitted into the template of being history with a current policy relevance, but I believe most of them did. In general, my focus was on problems of higher command and the interface between the military and their political leaders -an issue that has continuing relevance. I was also interested in recent military operations, in the belief that research on them was necessary to understand the contemporary problems faced by the military. This focus on military history did not win wide approval within the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at ANU. The first problem arose from the view of some 'mainstream' historians that military history was not a legitimate academic discipline. This misguided view might have been a hangover from the Vietnam War era, when many young historians were protesting against Australia's involvement in the war. The second problem was that the history I was writing was focused mainly on Australia. How could such research be accommodated within a school that was focused on AsiaPacific affairs? This latter argument also applied to other members of SDSC who were focusing their research on contemporary problems of Australian defence. Such research fitted within the charter of SDSC, but did not seem to fit neatly into the School's focus on the AsiaPacific. Following this line of argument, if a world-renowned scholar or practitioner such as, for example, Henry Kissinger or Sir Michael Howard had wished to take up an appointment at SDSC they would have been rejected because their focus was not specifically on the Asia-Pacific region. SDSC objected to the argument about the need to focus research specifically on the Asia-Pacific region, especially when it was applied as the means of deciding funding within the School, but without success.
The net result of this approach was that the School decided that my position in SDSC should not be funded; that is, I would no longer be employed by the School or ANU. Fortunately, the Chief of the Defence Force, Admiral Chris Barrie, decided to fund a chair of Australian Defence History at SDSC. I was appointed and took up the position in July 1999. The title of Professor of Australian Defence History was chosen to emphasise the fact that I would be concentrating on matters that would have direct relevance to Australian defence. I would be concerned not just with the analysis of past military battles, but with broader issues, such as the organisation of Defence, the relationship between Defence and the government, strategy, defence policy, operational concepts and intelligence. Throughout this period, I was the only member of SDSC writing consistently on defence history matters although, as I mentioned earlier, other members occasionally included some historical background in their works on current strategic and defence issues. My solo work was to come to an end during the first decade of the new century. Like the peacekeeping official history, the ASIO project required research into a vast number of official records, most of which remained classified. Also, like the peacekeeping official history, there was to be no censorship of the ASIO history, but the government reserved the right to prevent publication of matters that might be damaging to national security. I wrote the first volume, The Spy Catchers, The Official History of ASIO 1949 ASIO -1963 ASIO 1976 ASIO -1989 , is due to be published in 2016.
The two official history projects, therefore, provided SDSC with a group of military historians who began to establish SDSC as a major centre of military history research. Because these historians were recruited for the official history projects, they did not detract from the Centre's traditional research on contemporary strategic and defence issues. Indeed, they were able to add to them. For example, Blaxland contributed his expertise in South-East Asian affairs and Blaxland and Crawley contributed to the Centre's teaching expertise in the area of intelligence and security. This teaching complemented the Centre's long-standing expertise in this area that was developed through Ball's extensive publications over the previous three decades.
The official history projects were not the only reason for the expansion of SDSC's history expertise. In 2008 Daniel Marston was appointed a research fellow in a position funded by Defence. Employed to work on contemporary operational issues, he came with a solid military history background also, having completed his DPhil at Oxford University, where he was supervised by O'Neill, then Chichele Professor of the History of War, and then having worked at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. When he left SDSC in 2009 he was succeeded by Garth Pratten (arrived September 2010), who was the original principal research officer for the peacekeeping official history and then, like Marston, was a lecturer at Sandhurst. He had recently published Australian Battalion Commanders (2009).
In 2011, SDSC won the contract to deliver the academic component of the Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC) and, at about the same time, as a result of restructuring within the ANU, the Centre was required to teach undergraduate courses as well as running the Master's program. As a result, SDSC was able to advertise for considerably more staff. The staff to teach at ACSC needed an understanding of military affairs and candidates with PhDs in military history were well placed to gain appointments to many of the positions. The strength of military history at SDSC is driven home by that fact that in the three years 2013-15, SDSC staff members published 13 books on military, defence or intelligence history. These statistics do not include SDSC's publications on contemporary strategic and defence issues, where the Centre's strong record has been maintained. In 2015, SDSC had 21 academic staff (including three emeritus professors working in the Centre) and, of these, nine could be counted as a military, defence or war historian.
In addition to the impressive quality of its staff members, SDSC's PhD students have also undertaken research in military history. Recent successful PhD students have been Steven Paget, whose thesis was on interoperability between the Australian, British and US navies in naval gunfire support during the Korean, Vietnam and Gulf Wars, and who is now a lecturer at the United Kingdom Staff College; and Tristan Moss, whose PhD was on the experience and role of the Australian Army in Papua New Guinea in the postwar period. and 1989, when he was working at the AWM, but when he moved to the Classics program in the College of Arts and Social Sciences at ANU, he did not have enough time to complete the volume. The funds provided by Defence enabled him to be released from teaching to complete a large part of the volume, and he was joined by Crawley, who had completed his work on the ASIO project, and became joint author of Volume I. The Defence funds also allowed Bou to be released from his teaching duties at the ACSC and he became the lead author of Volume IV, covering missions in Africa after 1992. He was assisted by Breen, Pratten, the official history's long-serving research assistant, Miesje de Vogel, and myself. Volumes I and IV were scheduled to be completed by March 2016. This would mean that Australia's fourth official history series, comprising six volumes, had been managed and substantially written by staff of the SDSC, with some parts written by AWM staff working under my direction. There was a certain symmetry that the second head of SDSC, Bob O'Neill, had written the second official history series (on the Korean War) 30 years earlier. After agitating for many years, in 2011 I persuaded the AWM to commission a feasibility study into an official history of Iraq and Afghanistan and, in 2012, I undertook the study. The AWM Council agreed with my conclusion that a history was feasible and should begin as soon as possible. Attempts to obtain government approval were delayed by two changes of government during 2013 -Prime Minister Julia Gillard was replaced by Kevin Rudd in mid-2013 and, in turn, he was defeated in a general election by the Coalition led by Tony Abbott. As noted earlier, in 2014 the Abbott Government agreed to provide funds to complete the peacekeeping official history, thus clearing the way for a decision in April 2015 to fund the official history of Australia's engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
When SDSC was established on a shoestring in 1966, some of its far-sighted proponents no doubt hoped that 50 years later it would have developed to become the leading centre of strategic and defence studies research in the Asia-Pacific region. This is now the case. The Centre's research focus has changed slightly, but still bears some resemblance to its original structure. Whereas previously it was built around three pillars of research -Australian defence, global security and regional security -in 2016 its research was focused on three 'clusters' -Australian defence, military studies and AsiaPacific security. Military and defence history at SDSC stretches across these three research areas, providing a crucial underpinning for research into contemporary issues. Further, with substantial teaching responsibilities (which was not the case in 1966) history provides an ideal tool for introducing students to many of the key concepts of strategic and defence studies. SDSC is now a major centre for research in the field of military and defence history. This outcome could hardly have been imagined in 1966.
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